Abstract-Secure multiparty computation enables a set of users to evaluate certain functionalities on their respective inputs while keeping these inputs encrypted throughout the computation. In many applications, however, outsourcing these computations to an untrusted server is desirable, so that the server can perform the computation on behalf of the users. Unfortunately, existing solutions are either inefficient, rely heavily on user interaction, or require the inputs to be encrypted under the same public key-drawbacks making the employment in practice very limited. We propose a novel technique based on additively homomorphic encryption that avoids all these drawbacks. This method is efficient, requires no user interaction whatsoever (except for data upload and download), and allows evaluating any dynamically chosen function on inputs encrypted under different public keys. Our solution assumes the existence of two non-colluding but untrusted servers that jointly perform the computation by means of a cryptographic protocol. This protocol is proven to be secure in the semi-honest model. By developing application-tailored variants of our approach, we demonstrate its versatility and apply it in two real-world scenarios from different domains, privacy-preserving face recognition and private smart metering. We also give a proof-of-concept implementation to highlight its feasibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
O NLINE communication in today's society is mostly being done through central web-servers which process vast amounts of private data. Examples of online services exploiting this paradigm are social networks, online auctions, and cloud services to name just a few. In the recent years, many concerns have been raised regarding data privacy in these scenarios, and serious privacy breaches have occurred [1] - [3] .
In order to deal with these privacy threats to sensitive data, the concept of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) gains increasing importance. In this setting, the computation is carried out interactively between several participating parties, in a way that sensitive data is kept hidden (for example encrypted or shared among protocol participants) and only the desired output of the computation is available. In this paper we focus on solutions based on homomorphic encryption [4] , [5] . All current practically feasible SMC solutions heavily rely on interaction, since the basic encryption schemes in use support only limited homomorphisms. In order to perform more complex operations, decryption steps are needed, which require parties holding a secret key, or a share thereof, to be online. This interactive nature of the protocols greatly hinders adoption. Consider, for example, a scenario where a number of clients encrypt individual input data (such as individual sales records) and push it to a server, which is supposed to aggregate the data (in order to compute global sales statistics). In this case it is not feasible to assume that all (or most) clients are still online and able to assist the server in its computations.
The same problem holds for other scenarios as well, such as privacy-preserving smart metering: while individual meters should be able to encrypt their data and push it to a server for further processing, the party who performed the initial encryption should not be involved in further computations. This application shows another key characteristic of most practical problems: rather than encrypting all input data with the same public key, which is required by all known efficient SMC solutions, each party should be able to use its own pair of public and private keys. Thus, an efficient SMC solution is required that limits interaction with clients as much as possible, while allowing to compute on data encrypted with different public keys. More precisely, we are considering the following scenario in this paper: 1) A set of n mutually distrusting clients P 1 , . . . , P n (the number n may change dynamically over time), each having its own public and private key pair, encrypt data under their respective public keys and store these encryptions on a server C. 2) Any dynamically chosen function (i.e., the function does not need to be specified at the time data is encrypted) should be computed by C on the clients' data, while all inputs and intermediate results remain private. 3) Due to the fact that clients are not always online in practice, C needs the ability to compute these functions without any interaction of the clients. In particular, this also concerns the clients' retrieval of results. 4) Once online, individual clients can retrieve the result while the server learns nothing at all.
This setting has been addressed in many works before, while only providing partial solutions. Thus, we would like to recall related work and point out some limitations of possible approaches to solve our scenario, before explaining our approach.
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A. Previous Work
Most papers on SMC protocols are concerned with interactive solutions where all parties are actively involved in computing an arbitrary function on their respective inputs in a privacy-preserving manner [6] - [10] . Since we strive for a noninteractive solution, these constructions are not applicable in our scenario. To reduce computational costs at the clients' side, SMC has been considered in the client/server model (as we do) [11] - [16] , but again with interaction of the clients during the computations. Furthermore, Choi et al. [17] give a solution with minimal interaction of the clients, while relying on two non-colluding servers. Their solution, however, is mostly of theoretical interest both for efficiency reasons and because clients are bound to encrypt their private inputs under a single public key that is shared between the two servers (so clients do not have individual private keys). Therefore, in order to efficiently deal with modern star-like communication patterns where clients store their data on a central server (encrypted under their own associated public keys), Halevi et al. [18] proposed a solution in which, although being non-interactive, the server is entitled to learn the result of the computation which contradicts our setting where only clients are allowed to learn the output. In [19] , Gentry proposes to leverage Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) to solve the problem statement in our setting. Unfortunately, besides the lack of efficiency of recent FHE schemes [20] , the main drawback is that all clients need to run an interactive setup and an interactive decryption phase after the server computed the result. Very recently, López-Alt et al. [21] introduced the notion of On-the-Fly SMC as the first solution to a similar scenario as ours, yet still relying on an interactive decryption phase. They implement this by using a novel primitive called Multikey FHE that allows computation on data encrypted under multiple public keys, having similar efficiency shortcomings as all the other FHE schemes. More importantly, [21, Theorem B.1] proves (in the semi-honest model, similar to [22] ) any solution that runs non-interactively with the clients in the single server setting to be impossible to realize (drawing on the impossibility of program obfuscation).
B. Approaches to Related Problems
Following the impossibility result by López-Alt et al. [21] , we need at least two non-colluding servers, if we want complete non-interaction with the clients. Hence, we assume the existence of two semi-honest, non-colluding but otherwise untrusted servers C and S. This assumption is very common both in the theoretical (e.g., [12] , [17] ) and the practical community (e.g., [11] , [23] , [24] ). Next, we would like to point out two interesting approaches that solve a different but related problem:
1) Single-Key Approach. The second server S possesses a public-private key pair of some additively homomorphic encryption scheme. Every client encrypts its data using S's public key and stores this encryption at server C.
As the encryption scheme is additively homomorphic, C and S can run traditional SMC protocols to compute arbitrary functionalities, while the result is stored encrypted at C. A client receives this result in the clear by running an interactive protocol with server S who helps in the decryption without learning anything at all. We note that similar approaches already appear in the literature (cf. Beye et al. [25] or Boneh et al. [26] ). 2) Secret Sharing Approach. Every client secret shares its input and distributes it to the two servers, which can then compute any functionality in a secure two-party protocol. This is the secret sharing-based analogue of the previous single-key approach. Although both constructions seem very promising, they actually solve a different problem scenario, as we have the explicit goal of allowing clients to encrypt their data under their own keys. The first approach even requires client interaction during the decryption which we want to circumvent. The second approach, besides the fact that it cannot deal with encryptions under different keys, has the additional drawback that both servers have the same (large) amount of storage and workload. Moreover, there are certain application scenarios (e.g., Private Smart Metering as we describe in Section VII) where the use of homomorphic encryption is very appealing.
C. Our Contribution
We provide a novel efficient technique (based on additively homomorphic encryption) that turns the above mentioned single-key approach into one that relies on no client interaction and works on encryptions under multiple public keys (in contrast to the above secret sharing approach). Our solution employs two non-colluding, semi-honest but untrusted servers C and S. All steps in our protocol rely on no interaction with the clients whatsoever. These clients only initially store their encrypted inputs on the (main) server C who in turn can compute any dynamically chosen n-input function on n given (encrypted) inputs in an SMC protocol together with the second server S. We show our protocols secure in the semihonest model, meaning that all protocol participants follow the protocol description, but may try to gather information about other parties' inputs, intermediate results, or overall outputs just by looking at the transcripts. For performance reasons, this is the predominant security model used in practical implementations of SMC [8] , [11] , [23] , [24] , [27] - [29] , which particularly makes sense in our setting where the servers (performing the computations) are business driven parties in practice, and cheating would cause negative publicity and harm their reputation.
We make extensive use of the BCP cryptosystem by Bresson, Catalano and Pointcheval [30] which is both additively homomorphic (i.e., it allows addition of plaintexts in the encrypted domain) and offers two independent decryption mechanisms. The successful usage of the second decryption mechanism depends on a master secret key that is stored on the second server S in our proposal. With this in mind, the basic idea of our construction consists of three steps: 1) After collecting the individually encrypted inputs, the main server C runs an SMC protocol with S in order to transform these inputs into encryptions under the product of all involved public keys without changing the underlying plaintexts. 2) With these transformed ciphertexts (under the same key), we can run traditional addition and multiplication SMC protocols by using the additively homomorphic property of the underlying cryptosystem, allowing to compute any function represented by an arithmetic circuit. 3) Once the result (encrypted under the product of all keys) is ready, C runs a final SMC protocol with S in order to transform this result back into encryptions under the clients' respective public keys. Our approach is particularly suited to applications where clients are very resource-constrained and not always online such that having no interaction with these clients is of crucial importance. In this paper, we elaborate on two such applications from different domains. First, we deal with face recognition in social networks, where many users access their profiles via resource-constrained mobile devices that are not always online. In this setting, the tool of automated face recognition is used for image tagging services or in order to help law enforcement agencies to prosecute suspected persons. In order to show the feasibility of our approach, we implement an adaptation of Erkin et al.'s privacy-preserving face recognition protocol [29] to our construction and show a detailed performance analysis. Second, we consider the private aggregation of (energy) consumption in the smart metering scenario, where a distrusted (energy) supplier aggregates consumption readings from resource-constrained smart meters in a privacy-preserving manner [27] , [28] , [31] . As an additional contribution of our work and to highlight the versatility of our approach, we present three different variants of our construction that can be shown to be beneficial in such metering systems. Depending on the precise scenario, one of our variants allows for the intermediate (private) aggregation by other smart meters before the data arrives at the supplier. This is particularly interesting in the smart metering setting where sensor readings are relayed through other meters anyway due to the use of short-range communication networks. The other two variants deliberately sacrifice the non-interactive nature of our approach and allow the smart meters to have more control over their private data: interactively with all participating meters, the aggregated results can be disclosed either to the supplier only, or to all meters while the supplier learns nothing at all.
D. Outline
Some standard notation, the security model of semi-honest adversaries, and the BCP encryption scheme are summarized in Section II. We give our construction and proofs of correctness for the individual building blocks in Section III, while analyzing security in Section IV. Useful variants and opimizations of our protocols are given in Section V. We summarize our experimental results in Section VI and elaborate on application scenarios in Section VII. Finally, we conclude in Section VIII while focusing on possible future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation, Security Model, and Access Control
Throughout the paper, we use the following standard notation: We write x ←− X if X is a random variable or distribution and x is to be chosen randomly from X according to its distribution. In the case where X is solely a set, x U ←− X denotes that x is chosen uniformly at random from X. For an algorithm A we write x ←− A(y) if A outputs x on fixed input y according to A's distribution.
We assume all participants to be honest-but-curious, i.e., we consider the semi-honest model [32] . This means that all involved parties follow the protocols, but try to gather information about outputs (or intermediate results) of the computation just by looking at the protocols' transcripts. In addition, we assume that there is no collusion between any of the parties. Considering this model makes sense in our scenario as servers performing the computations are business driven parties in practice who do not want to harm their reputation and thus avoid cheating (which would cause negative publicity). Designing protocols in the semi-honest model is considered as the first step towards protocols that can deal with malicious adversaries. We see this as future work.
Finally, we note that, similar to [22] , it is possible to give each client more control over its private data by attaching access control policies to the encrypted inputs. These policies dictate what functions are allowed to be computed on the inputs and with what other inputs (from other clients) they are allowed to get combined. The enforcement of the policies would be done by the two servers C and S. To simplify our exposition, we will not include such access control policies in the rest of this document.
B. Additively Homomorphic Encryption
A public-key encryption scheme E = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is said to be additively homomorphic if there is an operation "·" in the encrypted domain (usually this is the multiplication) such that for given ciphertexts c 1 and c 2 , it holds that c 1 · c 2 is an encryption of the addition of the underlying plaintexts: 2 , where pk and sk are the public and secret key, respectively, and m 1 , m 2 are two plaintext messages. For a more extensive and formal treatment as well as examples such as the Paillier encryption scheme [33] , we refer to Armknecht et al. [34] .
In this work, we use the additively homomorphic cryptosystem by Bresson, Catalano and Pointcheval (BCP) [30] which offers two independent decryption mechanisms (we note that this encryption scheme has been concurrently, but independently proposed by Camenisch and Shoup [35] and Damgård and Jurik [36] ). The second decryption mechanism decrypts a given ciphertext successfully if and only if a certain master secret key is known. The general setting for such schemes with a double decryption mechanism is as follows: Besides the usual key generation, encryption and decryption algorithms of the users, a master runs an initial setup to generate public parameters and a master secret. This master secret can then be used in a master decryption algorithm (the second decryption mechanism) to successfully decrypt any given ciphertext. We require such homomorphic schemes with a double decryption mechanism to be semantically secure, which informally means that one cannot distinguish between encryptions of known messages and random messages.
The BCP Cryptosystem. The BCP encryption scheme [30] consists of the following algorithms:
Setup(κ), the master setup that generates the public parameters and the master secret: for security parameter κ, choose a safe-prime RSA-modulus N = pq (i.e., p = 2 p + 1 and q = 2q +1 for distinct primes p and q , resp.) of bitlength κ. Pick a random element g ∈ Z * N 2 of order ppsuch that
The plaintext space is Z N and the algorithm outputs the public parameters PP = (N, k, g) and the master secret MK = ( p , q ).
KeyGen(PP), the key generation algorithm that generates the users' public-secret key-pairs: pick a random a ∈ Z N 2 and compute h = g a mod N 2 . The algorithm outputs the public key pk = h and the secret key sk = a.
Enc (PP,pk) (m), the encryption algorithm: given a user's public key pk and a plaintext m ∈ Z N , pick a random r ∈ Z N 2 and output the ciphertext (A, B) as
Dec (PP,sk) (A, B), the "user" decryption of the cryptosystem which uses the user's secret key sk = a and only runs successfully on encryptions under the corresponding user's public key pk = g a mod N 2 : given a ciphertext (A, B) and secret key sk = a, output the plaintext m as
mDec (PP,pk,MK) (A, B), the "master" decryption which uses the master secret key MK and runs successfully on any properly created ciphertext, no matter under whose user's public key it was created: given a ciphertext (A, B) (encrypted using the randomness r ∈ Z N 2 ), a user's public key pk = h and the master secret MK. Let sk = a denote the user's private key corresponding to pk = h. First compute a mod N as
where k −1 denotes the inverse of k modulo N. Then compute
Let δ denote the inverse of p q modulo N and set γ := ar mod N. The algorithm outputs the plaintext m as
For proofs of correctness and semantic security (under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption), we refer to [30] . If the context is clear, we omit the public parameters PP in the algorithms, e.g., we write Enc pk (m) instead of Enc (PP,pk) (m). Basic concept of our construction: Clients P 1 , . . . , P n upload encryptions of their private data m 1 , . . . , m n to server C, which in turn engages in an SMC protocol with server S to compute y = f (m 1 , . . . , m n ) in the encrypted domain. Once the protocol is done, each client P i who is allowed to learn the result, is sent an encryption of y under its respective key.
III. OUR CONSTRUCTION
Recall that we are considering a scenario with n (mutually distrusting) clients, denoted by P 1 , . . . , P n , each having its own pair of public and private keys
. . , n) stores private data m i encrypted under its respective public key pk i on an untrusted server C. Now, C is assigned to compute an arbitrary n-input function f on the clients' inputs, while keeping the inputs and intermediate results private. We represent such functions f by means of arithmetic circuits, i.e., the computation of a given function amounts to the evaluation of addition and multiplication gates over encrypted inputs. More details on this and other means of representing a function f can be found in [37] .
Our basic idea to realize this functionality can be summarized as follows (illustrated in Fig. 1 ):
1) We assume the existence of a second untrusted server S that acts semi-honestly and that does not collude with any of the other parties. See the discussion on the semihonest model in Section II and on the use of two noncolluding servers in the Introduction for further details on why this is a reasonable and worthwhile assumption. 2) Initially, S runs a setup Init that sets up the system and distributes the system's public parameters. 3) After this initial setup, clients can use the cryptosystem's KeyGen (independently of any further party) to generate their respective pair of public and private keys, and to upload encryptions of their private data to the server C. 4) Once an (arbitrary) function f is to be evaluated on the, say, n inputs m 1 , . . . , m n of clients P 1 , . . . , P n , the server C runs a cryptographic protocol with the second server S that consists of only four building blocks: KeyProd, Add, Mult and TransDec. KeyProd tranforms all ciphertexts to encryptions under a single public key (whose corresponding secret key is unknown), Add and Mult evaluate addition and multiplication gates on encrypted inputs, respectively, and TransDec transforms the encrypted result f (m 1 , . . . , m n ) back to n encryptions each under a different client's public key. The overall protocol is run with no interaction of the clients whatsoever. Recall that the inputs m 1 , . . . , m n are encrypted under different public keys. 5) After all computations are done, each client retrieves the encrypted output of the server C which it decrypts locally with its respective private key in order to get the result f (m 1 , . . . , m n ). We explain the individual steps of our protocols:
Initialization. Initially, a setup process initializes the BCP cryptosystem and distributes the system's public parameters. This setup is run by the second server S (since S is semihonest and needs the master secret). We denote this algorithm by Init, which simply runs the algorithm Setup of the BCP cryptosystem and sends its public parameters PP = (N, k, g ) to the server C.
Data Upload. In order to upload private data to the server C, a client P i (for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) first needs to receive the system's public parameters PP = (N, k, g) to be able to generate its own pair of public and private keys (pk i , sk i ). After these keys are generated using algorithm KeyGen(PP) of the BCP cryptosystem, the client P i can encrypt its private data m i by computing (A i , B i ) ←− Enc (PP,pk i ) (m i ) and upload it together with its public key pk i to the server C.
Cryptographic Protocol Between Servers C and S. Assume that the server C wants to compute an encryption of f (m 1 , . . . , m n ) for an n-input function f where m 1 , . . . , m n are the private inputs of the clients P 1 , . . . , P n . Recall that during the data upload phase, C retrieved only encryptions of the inputs m 1 , . . . , m n . C does its computations by means of a cryptographic protocol between C and S consisting of the 4 subprotocols: KeyProd, Add, Mult and TransDec.
Recall that we represent the function f by an arithmetic circuit, meaning that we have to be able to securely evaluate addition and multiplication gates. Addition gates seem to be easy to deal with since the underlying cryptosystem is additively homomorphic. Unfortunately though, the clients' inputs are encrypted under different public keys and the additive property of the BCP cryptosystem only works for encryptions under the same public key. Therefore, the server C first runs the algorithm KeyProd which transforms all involved ciphertexts to encryptions under a single key. This single key is the product of all involved public keys and so C remains unable to decrypt the ciphertexts as it does not know the corresponding secret key. In fact, the secret key needed to decrypt encryptions under the product of all clients' public keys is the sum of all clients' secret keys. Of course, decryption still works by using the master secret which is only known to the second server S and not to C. We stress that S never gets to see encryptions of the clients' original inputs but only blinded versions, so it does not learn these inputs although having the master secret.
After this key-transformation of ciphertexts, the additive property of the underlying cryptosystem can be exploited to securely evaluate addition gates. This step is denoted by Add. Multiplication gates can be securely evaluated by (an adapted version of) the well-known protocol of [4] , essentially relying on "blinding-the-plaintext" techniques. This is done by our protocol Mult. Finally, once the complete arithmetic circuit representing the function f is successfully evaluated by using Add and Mult, C runs the protocol TransDec in order to transform the results (encrypted under the product of all public keys) back to encryptions of the individual clients' public keys without changing the underlying plaintext.
In the following, we describe the individual building blocks for this protocol between C and S.
The Subprotocol KeyProd. The purpose of this protocol is to transform the encryptions of all participating clients P 1 , . . . , P n into encryptions under a single public key, namely the product Prod.pk := n i=1 pk i mod N 2 of all involved public keys without changing the underlying plaintexts. 2 The corresponding secret key required to successfully decrypt an encryption under Prod.pk is the sum n i=1 sk i of all clients' secret keys. This subprotocol needs to be run only once per fixed set of encrypted inputs and does not depend on the actual function C wants to evaluate. This means that after the execution of KeyProd, any function (according to the access control policies attached to each input) can be computed on the transformed ciphertexts.
For a given ciphertext (A i , B i ) encrypted under the public key pk i of the client P i (i = 1, . . . , n), C blinds the ciphertext with a random message τ i and sends it to S. Since S knows the master secret MK, it uses it to decrypt this blinded ciphertext and re-encrypt it under the product of all clients' public keys. The result of this is then sent back to C who can remove the blinding τ i again, achieving an encryption under the product key without changing the underlying plaintext. A detailed description of these steps can be seen in Fig. 2 .
The Subprotocols Add and Mult. Recall that the server C wants to compute the function f , which we consider to be represented as an arithmetic circuit over the ring Z N (note that hitting on a value in Z N which is not invertible modulo N happens with negligible probability only). Therefore, we have to deal with addition-and multiplication-gates in Z N . Without loss of generality, we consider these as 2-input-1-output gates. The algorithm Add deals with an addition-gate, while the subprotocol Mult deals with a multiplication-gate. We start with the former and stress that it is a non-interactive protocol which does not need the server S. This is due to the fact that the underlying BCP cryptosystem is additively homomorphic for encryptions under the same public key. We recall that this is exactly what the subprotocol KeyProd achieved by computing encryptions under the product Prod.pk, so all clients' private inputs m 1 , . . . , m n are now encrypted under the same public key. Now, given two encryptions (A, B) and (A , B ) under Prod.pk, server C computes the sum of their underlying plaintext messages by computing (A,
A multiplication-gate, however, has to be computed interactively with the server S. In fact, the protocol we use is an adaptation of the well-known multiplication protocol of [4] A 1 , B 1 ) , . . . , (A 1 , B 1 ) of the same plaintext, encrypted under pk 1 , . . . , pk n , respectively.
which sends blinded version of the original ciphertexts (that are to be multiplied) to S that in turn uses the master secret to decrypt. Then, S performs the multiplication in the clear and re-encrypts. The (encrypted) result is sent back to C, which can remove the blinding again. Details are given in Fig. 3 .
The Subprotocol TransDec. Finally, the task of subprotocol TransDec is to take the encrypted result of f (m 1 , . . . , m n ), encrypted under Prod.pk, and to transform it back to n encryptions of the same plaintext f (m 1 , . . . , m n ), each under a different client's public key pk 1 , . . . , pk n , respectively. Again, the idea is to blind the original ciphertext and send it to S, which in turn decrypts using the master secret and then creates n encryptions for each client's public key. The created ciphertexts are returned to C which removes the blindings. The precise steps of this protocol are summarized in Fig. 4 . Data Retrieval. Each client P i , i = 1, . . . , n, can get the result of the computation by first retrieving (from C) the encryption of f (m 1 , . . . , m n ) under its key pk i that has been computed during the subprotocol TransDec, and then decrypting this ciphertext by using its corresponding private key sk i .
IV. CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY
A. Correctness
We assume that all participants follow our protocol decriptions. Furthermore, we assume that the initial setup Init has been performed correctly, and that all clients (wishing to participate) sent their encrypted private data to the server C as described in the section on data upload. Under these assumptions, we show that the remaining protocols KeyProd, Add, Mult and TransDec produce the desired outputs correctly.
KeyProd: Observe that for i = 1, . . . , n, the values (C i , D i ) are just blinded versions (using τ i ) of the original input ciphertexts (A i , B i ) , which are then decrypted (using the master secret MK) and re-encrypted under the product key Prod.pk. The resulting values (W i , Z i ) can then be transformed back to encryptions of the original underlying plaintexts by using the additively homomorphic property of the BCP scheme, and substracting the blinding value τ i again.
Add: The correctness of this algorithm follows immediately from the additively homomorphic property and we refer to [30] for details.
Mult: We show that the output ciphertext (A, B) of algorithm Mult is indeed an encryption (under Prod.pk) of the multiplication of the underlying plaintexts m, m of the two input ciphertexts (A, B), (A , B ) (encrypted under Prod.pk), respectively. Observe that the decryption of (A, Fig. 3 ). The expansion of this term gives mm − σ m − σ m + σ σ + σ m + σ m + (−σ σ ) = mm , which is the desired result.
TransDec: Recall that this protocol takes an encryption (A, B) under Prod.pk of a message m as input and outputs ciphertexts (A i , B i ), which are encryptions of the same message m but under the different keys pk i , for i = 1, . . . , n. In this protocol, essentially, C blinds the ciphertext (A, B) by adding a random message τ to the underlying plaintext m, which S decrypts and encrypts again under pk i , for all i = 1, . . . , n. It is obvious that once C subtracted τ again, the resulting ciphertext will be an encryption of m under pk i , for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Since KeyProd is independent of the actual function f that is to be computed, we see that once the underlying message f (m 1 , . . . , m n ) has been computed in the encrypted domain (using Add and Mult), the correctness of TransDec yields that each client P i can retrieve its dedicated encryption of f (m 1 , . . . , m n ), which it can successfully decrypt by using its corresponding private key sk i , i = 1, . . . , n.
B. Security
The following security analysis considers the semi-honest model only, as mentioned in Section II, meaning that all parties follow the protocol description but try to gather information about other parties' inputs, intermediate results, or overall outputs just by looking at the protocol's transcripts. As usual, security in this model is proven in the "real-vs.-ideal" framework [32, Ch. 7] : there is an ideal model where all computations are performed via an additional trusted party and it is then shown that all adversarial behavior in the real model (where there is no trusted party) can be simulated in the ideal model. We deal with each subprotocol individually which is possible due to the Composition Theorem for the semi-honest model [32, Theorem 7.3.3]. Note that the security of all our protocols is essentially based on the well-known concept of "blinding" the plaintext: Given an encryption of a message, we use the additively homomorphic property of the cryptosystem to add a random message, which blinds the original plaintext.
Recall that before the actual computations (i.e., the cryptographic protocol) are performed between servers C and S, there is only the initial setup of the BCP cryptosystem and the step where clients P 1 , . . . , P n store their encrypted private inputs m 1 , . . . , m n on the server C -for these two steps, the security follows from the semantic security of the BCP cryptosystem. Since we assume no collusion at all between any of the participating parties, it remains to show that neither C nor S learn anything from the cryptographic protocol (consisting of KeyProd, Add, Mult and TransDec) computing the n encryptions of f (m 1 , . . . , m n ) under the clients' public keys pk 1 , . . . , pk n , respectively.
KeyProd: The only data sent is fresh ciphertexts. Due to the blinding values τ i , i = 1, . . . , n, and the semantic security of the BCP cryptosystem, these encryptions are indistinguishable from random ciphertexts and are therefore easily simulatable by encryption of, say, 1. Hence, both servers C and S do not learn anything at all from these ciphertexts.
Add: This algorithm is non-interactive and does not involve the server S at all, so we are only concerned about C. For C, however, no information leakage is assured by the semantic security of the BCP scheme since Add just uses the additively homomorphic property of the cryptosystem.
Mult: Again, the only data sent is fresh ciphertexts of blinded messages and due to the semantic security of the underlying cryptosystem, we can simulate these by random encryptions.
TransDec: Basically, the security argument here is the same as for the protocol KeyProd. The first step of TransDec is for C to blind the underlying message of the ciphertext (A, B) (which is encrypted under Prod.pk) with the random message τ . This ensures that S does not learn any information about the original plaintext when receiving the "blinded" ciphertext (C, D). On the other hand, since C receives fresh encryptions under the public keys of the clients, he gets no information about the underlying plaintext whatsoever. In the language of simulations, a formal proof would amount to simulating the views which again is possible by using random encryptions due to the semantic security of the BCP scheme.
Adversarial Computing Power.
We note that server S only sees blinded messages (after decryption). Since the used blinding values are chosen uniformly at random from the plaintext space Z N , the underlying messages are encrypted with a onetime-pad in Z N with the random blinding values as secret keys. This type of encryption is perfect (i.e., informationtheoretically) secure. Therefore, the computing power of server S (treated as an adversary) does not have to be bounded. At the same time, however, we require the computing power of C to be polynomially bounded as the BCP cryptosystem only offers semantic security in the presence of PPT adversaries.
V. VARIANTS OF THE CONSTRUCTION
Recall that the main goal of our construction was to get rid of any interaction with the users. There are certain application scenarios (cf. Section VII), however, where the interaction with users is explicitly wanted, e.g., when the server is allowed to learn the result upon the approval of all participating users. In this section, we want to highlight the flexibility of our solution by giving three variants of our original proposal that allow leveraging it to such applications as well: Intermediate Key Aggregation. Assume that the (encrypted) private data of a client Q participating in our protocol is not sent to the server C directly (in the data upload), but goes through other clients Q 1 , . . . , Q (a subset of all clients P 1 , . . . , P n ). The protocol presented here optimizes KeyProd in this scenario: Recall, that KeyProd takes all the participating clients' ciphertexts (A i , B i ) as input and transforms these to encryptions under the product Prod.pk of all participating public keys. The optimization we aim for does the aggregation of the public keys of the clients Q, Q 1 , . . . , Q before the ciphertexts end up at the server C. More precisely, let (A, B) be a ciphertext of a message m encrypted under a public key pk which arrives at client Q i , i = 1, . . . , . This client can then use its own public key pk i in order generate an encryption of the same message m but encrypted under the product pk · pk i mod N 2 . This "key aggregation" is one step that otherwise had to be done by the second server S in the original algorithm KeyProd. Since Q i knows its own private key, it can use the first component A and raise it to the power of its private key. The result of this can then be multiplied with the second component B which transforms the ciphertext (A, B) to an encryption under pk · pk i mod N 2 . Details of this are described in Fig. 5 . The correctness of this algorithm is easily seen:
The security of this variant is implied by the security of the BCP cryptosystem. This is because the first client Q in the chain of clients is simply giving away a fresh encryption under its own public key. (m 1 , . . . , m n ) of the computation done by the server C, but if all clients approve it, C should be able to retrieve the result (while all clients stay oblivious). More precisely, let (A, B) denote the encrypted result of the computation done by the server C before applying algorithm TransDec to it (so (A, B) is an encryption under the public key Prod.pk). We assume that the participating clients P 1 , . . . , P n are not supposed to see the (encrypted) result, but on their approval (from all of them), the server C should be able to decrypt (A, B) in order to see the result of the computation. To achieve this, we can run protocol ODApproval of Fig. 6 instead of TransDec.
The basic idea of this protocol is to run the "key aggregation" in reversed order, meaning that C blinds the first component A of the encrypted result and sends it to the clients. By using their respective private keys, each client returns a modified version of A. Now, recall that the result is encrypted under the product Prod.pk of all clients' public keys. Hence, these modified versions of A can be used by C to "divide out" the public keys of each client seperately, ending up with an encryption under the public key 1 which simply is the plaintext itself.
The correctness of this protocol is shown by proving that if (A, B) is an encryption of m under the public key Prod.pk, then the output m of ODApproval equals this message m . If (A, B) was encrypted by using randomness r , then
where
As for the security, we note that clients do not learn anything at all since the plaintext is encoded in the second component of the ciphertext (A, B) which is never sent to any of the clients. So the plaintext remains information theoretically secure.
Concerning the server C, we recall that due to the semantic security of the BCP cryptosystem, C is not able to compute the randomness used to encrypt (A, B) and so the clients' messages X i are indistinguishable from random elements in g . This also implies that as long as one of the messages X i is missing, C is not able to decrypt: Assume that the final message X n is missing and C already computed N 2 ) , i.e., an encryption under the public key of P n which is the client from whom the message X n is still missing. Interactive Decryption by all Clients. Assume that we want all participating clients to decrypt the result of C's computation together (in an interactive protocol) so that neither the server C nor the server S learn the result, but all clients do (if and only if all clients participate). Essentially, this can be achieved by using the protocol ODApproval (cf. Fig. 6 ). Server C sends the re-randomized encryption (A, B) to all clients and then, instead of sending the values X 1 , . . . , X n to the server C, for each i = 1, . . . , n, client P i broadcasts its respective value X i to all other clients. Upon retrieval of all these values X 1 , . . . , X n , each client is now able to decrypt (in the same way as C does in Fig. 6) the ciphertext (A, B) to reveal the underlying result of C's computation. The correctness of this protocol follows from the correctness of ODApproval.
The same argument as for the previous variant shows that all messages X 1 , . . . , X n need to be received in order to decrypt the ciphertext (A, B) . So decryption is not possible until all clients broadcasted their respective value X i . Since the clients never see the (encrypted) private inputs of other clients, they cannot learn more than the decryption of (A, B) which is the result of the computation done by the server C.
VI. PERFORMANCE
The performance of our contribution depends on the security parameter κ, the number of clients n, the number of additions and multiplications performed, and the network performance (bandwidth and latency). All algorithms, except Init are solely based on arithmetic operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, exponentiation, inversion, division, comparison) modulo N or N 2 and random number generation. The size of N grows linearly with κ. A full overview of the complexity of each protocol step is given in Table I . To show that our system can be used in practice, we implemented a proof-ofconcept version of all protocols in python. Because the speed of the implementation depends mainly on the speed of the bignum library, we used the GMP library though pythons gmpy module. The GMP library is known to be asymptotically faster than pythons native bignum library, when it comes to processing bigger numbers. GMP offers all basic operations we need, except for the generation of safe primes numbers. Therefore, we also used the OpenSSL library through a custom C-binding, but solely for generating safe prime numbers. We used a TCP network connection over the loopback interface for transferring data between the two servers. The runtime of our code is heavily influenced by the size of N. We recommend a size of N of at least 1024 bits for security reasons. Therefore, we performed all benchmarks with these three security parameters. We performed all tests on a Lenovo Thinkpad T410s with an Intel Core i5 M560 running at 2.67 GHz with Debian Sid, Python 2.7.3rc2 and gmpy 1.15-1. We ran all clients and both servers on the same host, so that network latency can be ignored. Algorithm Init has the worst time complexity due to the generation of two safe primes. Its runtime is expected to vary, because the number of instructions it needs to execute in order to find two suitable primes depends on the random numbers generated by the algorithm. Fig. 7(a) shows the runtime distribution of Init, depending on κ. 20 tests were performed for each choice of κ, and it is clearly visible that the runtime varies a lot.
In the next step, we determined how long it takes to encrypt all client's inputs, transcode them at the server and hand the result back to the clients (omitting the initialization step). Fig. 7(b) shows that our implementation scales linearly with the number of clients. Without any arithmetic operations, we can perform a full protocol run with 16 clients in 1.7 seconds, using a 1536 bit modulus. This includes the encryption of inputs at the client side (sequentially). In practice, this step will be done in parallel by each client independently. Finally, we were interested in the runtime of Add and Mult. Fig. 7(c) shows that an addition is much faster than a multiplication. With a 1536 bit modulus, about 25,000 additions, but only 5 multiplications can be performed per second. We stress again that we ignored network latency and that algorithm Mult runs interactively between servers C and S. Therefore, when used in practice, the actual runtime of Mult will be even higher (depending on the latency).
Comparison With the Single-Key Approach. Assuming that the single-key construction (which cannot deal with encryptions under different keys, see Section I) uses Paillier encryption [33] , the de facto standard in additively homomorphic encryption, and assuming no key transformations in our construction, we get approximately double the costs, both in terms of computation and communication. This is due to the fact that ciphertexts in the BCP scheme have double the size of Paillier encryptions, while encryptions and decryptions (taking pre-computations into account) require one additional exponentiation modulo N 2 , and additions in the encrypted domain require one additional multiplication modulo N 2 . This shows that our approach achieves computation on encrypted data across different keys while requiring only little additional costs.
VII. APPLICATIONS
We present two applications of our general-purpose construction. First, we adapt the privacy-preserving face recognition protocol by Erkin et al. [29] to our technique and provide a performance analysis to show the feasibility of our approach. Second, we apply our variants from Section V to private consumption aggregation in the smart metering setting. We stress that we are not providing entire solutions to these two application scenarios, but solely want to demonstrate the potential of our construction in such scenarios, which both would benefit from the non-inter-active nature of our protocols.
Privacy-Preserving Face Recognition.
Face recognition is a widely-used tool in many areas of modern everyday life, among which social networks probably is one of the most important. Many social networks use face recognition tools for things like automatic photo tagging or in order to help law enforcement agencies to prosecute suspected persons (to name just a few). This is usually being done without the explicit consent of users, raising important privacy concerns, as convincingly demonstrated in [29] . Therefore, Erkin et al. [29] proposed the first privacy-preserving protocol for face recognition which, however, heavily relies on user interaction. Unfortunately, their solution generally does not work in the social network setting where users access their profiles by using resource-constrained mobile devices which are not always online. Therefore, having a completely noninteractive (with the users) solution is crucial in such scenarios.
In order for such a system to be completely non-interactive, it is required that users have their own public keys under which the results of the face recognition protocol will be encrypted.
Similarly to Erkin et al. [29] , the database of "known images" (i.e., when given a face image, we want to find out whether it is in the database or not) is unencrypted in our setting. For instance, in the scenario of helping with the prosecution of suspected persons, the database of known images consists of the suspected persons and is therefore known by the social network provider in plaintext (unencrypted). On the other hand, it is desirable to have all users' profile pictures (or images of users' holidays etc.) encrypted, so that the social network provider is only able to recognize faces that are found in the database while all other faces remain hidden. 3 To achieve this goal, we adapt the privacy-preserving protocol by Erkin et al. [29] to our framework.
We stress that we deliberately implemented all protocols only by using our general-purpose construction as is, without any tricks to optimize the performance, such as switching to the much more efficient DGK cryptosystem for computing the minimal distance, or treating the fact that most computations can be done in an offline pre-computation phase. However, all such tricks can be applied to our protocols in exactly the same way as in [29] . For instance, switching to the DGK cryptosystem is done when determining whether a small value d that server S knows in the clear is less or greater-thanor-equal to a small value r that C holds in the clear. This comparison is the computational bottleneck of the whole face recognition protocol. The DGK cryptosystem provides a way to do this comparison very efficiently as long as the values d and r are small. Since C and S know the values in the clear, Erkin et al. [29] propose that S runs the DKG key generation and sends the public key to C. Then, C and S perform the comparison DGK-encrypted while at the end of the protocol, S learns a DGK-encrypted blinded bit b indicating whether d < r or d ≥ r , while C knows the blinding value (which is a bit itself). In [29] , S decrypts this blinded bit b and then encrypts it again with the Paillier encryption scheme [33] , sends the result to C who in turn removes the blinding value. We note that C's knowledge of the Paillier encrypted bit b is enough to perform the remaining steps of the comparison used in the face recognition protocol (see [29] for details). Adapting this approach to our system would boil down to the replacement of the Paillier encryption scheme with the BCP scheme in the final step where S re-encrypts the blinded bit b. We did not implement these tricks to show the performance of our general-purpose construction in its plain as-is state without tweaking it to specific application scenarios. We implemented the complete protocol in python while basing it on our implementation of our general-purpose construction described in Section VI. All tests were performed in the same setting as in Section VI with the security parameter κ = 1024.
To avoid confusion, we used the same parameters for our implementation as [29] . In particular, we also used the "ORL Database of Faces" from AT&T Laboratories Cambridge [38] containing 10 images of 40 different subjects, yielding a total amount of 400 images. 4 These images are of size 92 × 112 pixels, which we represented as vectors of length L = 92 · 112 = 10304. This setup ensures the same reliability results as in [29] , which obtains a correct classification rate of ≈ 96% in the identification setting using the standard Eigenfaces recognition algorithm by Turk and Pentland [39] . We stress that we achieve such a high classification rate as the ORL database contains images from a controlled environment and it will be much lower for real social network profile pictures. It is demonstrated in [29] that K > 12 eigenfaces in the enrolment phase do not significantly increase the correct classification rate in case of the ORL database, which is why we used their suggestion of K = 12 (for M = 10, we used K = 5 instead). Table II depicts the results of our performance analysis of the complete protocol (containing both C's and S's costs). The first column shows the amount M of feature vectors stored in the database, while the second column shows the runtime (wall clock time in seconds) of the full protocol per invocation with one face image (that is to be matched with the database). The runtime shown in the second column contains the enrolment phase which in each case took less than 1% time of the shown overall runtime. We therefore included the enrolment phase here, since it does not significantly change the overall performance. The communication complexity (measured with iptables) is summarized in the other two columns: the third column shows the data traffic (in megabytes) sent from C to S, while the fourth shows the total traffic from S back to C.
Finally, the fifth column shows the runtime (in seconds) of the full protocol (per single query) when using a remote server S over the Internet. For this remote setup, we connected our Lenovo Thinkpad T410s (server C) with a 20 Mbit/s consumers cable connection to the Internet and started our server S implementation on a remote system equipped with a 3.2 GHz AMD Phenom II X6 1090T processor in a datacenter connected to the Internet with a Gigabit Ethernet adapter. The average round trip time to that system was 32 ms, measured with the linux "ping" utility.
In summary, for a database of size M = 200, a full protocol run requires ≈ 16 minutes (both when running S locally or remotely) for checking whether a given encrypted image is contained in the database or not. Again, we stress that we can apply the same performance tweaks to our protocol as done in [29] , which would yield a significant efficiency boost. More techniques to further enhance the performance in face recognition can also be found in [40] .
Private Smart Metering. Another interesting application domain, actively promoted by many governments, concerns the deployment of smart grids for modernizing the distribution networks of electricity, gas or water. For such services, smart meters record the consumption of individual consumers on a fine-grained basis and send all collected data to a central authority (the supplier), which in turn uses these inputs to compute overall consumptions, bills (by using dynamic pricing schemes), usage patterns, or to detect fraud or leakage in other utilities. Due to the collection of massive amount of sensitive data, privacy concerns have been raised in the past years, and various solutions protecting the consumers' privacy have been proposed for different computing tasks of the supplier. Depending on the scenario, it should also be possible for the supplier to send out customized recommendations on the basis of (encrypted) data from other meters in a way such that only the receiving smart meter is able to see the recommendation.
Here, we focus on private consumption aggregation only (and the possibility to send out recommendations on the basis of these aggregations) while dealing with a semi-honest supplier. In this setting, current solutions either only consider eavesdropping outsiders (and not the supplier) [28] , allow the supplier to see certain results (e.g., intermediate aggregations [41] ), require interaction and high computational overhead at the smart meters [27] , [31] , rely on trusted components alongside each smart meter [42] , [43] , or accept a certain decrease in the utility of the aggregated results by using differentially private mechanisms [44] (their system is also very restrictive in what kind of aggregations can be performed). We stress that we are not concerned with neither fraud detection nor the non-repudiation, integrity, or verifiability of aggregated results (see [31] for a treatment of these aspects).
Our construction of Section III offers a protocol with low computational costs at and minimal communication with the smart meters. As recently noted in [45] , achieving a solution with minimal communication overhead at the smart meters is one of the great research challenges. We hope that our approach provides another step forward to cope with this challenge. The smart meters would act as the clients in our protocol description of Section III, sending their encrypted private data to the supplier C. With our cryptographic protocol between C and a second server S, the supplier C can essentially compute any function on the consumers' inputs in a privacypreserving way. Compared to the above mentioned existing works that can hide the aggregated result (and intermediate results) from the supplier, our approach offers the unique feature of requiring no interaction with the meters during computations while allowing all kind of different aggregations (and not just additions). Exceptions are the approaches [42] and [43] that require trusted components at the smart meters, and the approach in [44] using differentially private mechanisms which comes at the cost of decreased utility and restricted aggregation methods.
Furthermore, concerning private consumption aggregation, we can extend the distributed incremental data aggregation approach of [28] in order to protect the consumers' privacy from the supplier C as well. In [28] , the idea is to encrypt each consumer's private data with an additively homomorphic encryption scheme under the public key of the supplier C and then send this encrypted information through other households in the neighbourhood (this is due to the use of short-range communication networks) in order to finally reach the supplier. Intermediate households aggregate their private data to the one they receive by using the additive property of the cryptosystem. Once the supplier received the data from all these chains of households, it aggregates these encryptions together to get the aggregation of all consumers' inputs. In [28] , only eavesdropping adversaries (such as the intermediate households) are considered. By employing our construction variant "Intermediate Key Aggregation", we can protect the consumers' privacy from intermediate households as well as from the supplier: Consumer P 1 encrypts its private data by using its own public key pk 1 and sends it to the next consumer P 2 which in turn uses the "Intermediate Key Aggregation" algorithm to transform the encryption into an encryption under the product pk 1 pk 2 mod N 2 of the two consumers' public keys. Furthermore, P 2 encrypts its own private input under this product pk 1 pk 2 mod N 2 as well and uses the additively homomorphic property of the BCP cryptosystem to aggregate its encrypted input to the encrypted input of the first consumer P 1 . These steps continue through the whole chain of consumers until the supplier C is reached. C can now aggregate all the remaining consumers' encrypted inputs (similar to [28] ) but still is unable to see any of the underlying plaintexts. Depending on the application, we can continue in three ways: 1) C decrypts the result jointly with the second server S (recall that S still has the master secret); 2) use the variant "Disclosure by Clients' Approval" meaning that C can only decrypt by all consumers' approval;
3) C sends the encrypted result of the aggregation (or any other evaluation on the basis of this aggregation) back to the consumers for local decryption.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Assuming the existence of two semi-honest and noncolluding but otherwise untrusted servers, we presented a new technique for the efficient and secure outsourcing of general-purpose SMC protocols between n users to these two servers. Our technique is based on the BCP encryption scheme, requires no user interaction at all, and allows the evaluation of arbitrary computable functions on inputs encrypted under different public keys. We show our protocol to be secure in the semi-honest model and highlight its practicability by giving experimental results. The shown possibility of employing our technique in two application scenarios, namely on privacypreserving face recognition and private consumption aggregation in smart metering, underlines its feasibility and versatility.
We consider the extension to the malicious adversarial model as future work and we plan to experiment with certain functionalities found in other application scenarios, e.g., in genomic processing [46] . To this end, it seems useful to also integrate our work into tools for automating SMC [47] .
